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INTRODUCTION 
n recent years, the Oregon Court of Appeals has overturned a 
number of juvenile court orders based on the Oregon juvenile 
dependency statute, which provides that a juvenile court has 
jurisdiction over a child when the child’s circumstances or condition 
are such as to endanger him or her.1 Juvenile dependency jurisdiction 
is the mechanism through which courts intervene to protect children 
who are at risk of abuse or neglect. Taking jurisdiction of a child 
makes the child a ward of the court.2 This Comment discusses 
contemporary cases in an effort to analyze this ongoing trend and 
argues that the Oregon Court of Appeals is actively working to clarify 
the proper standard for taking jurisdiction over a child based on risk 
of abuse or neglect.3 An analysis of facts and holdings from recent 
cases demonstrates this trend and shows that the court of appeals is 
limiting the reach of the juvenile court in the absence of a direct risk 
to the child, thereby protecting parents’ constitutional rights. 
Part I provides an overview of parents’ constitutional rights and the 
protective role the state plays on behalf of children. It also discusses 
the challenges courts face when determining whether to intrude into a 
family when allegations of abuse or neglect suggest that a child may 
be at risk. With this background in place, Part II begins by describing 
the Oregon Supreme Court’s interpretation of the standard laid out in 
the juvenile dependency statute and briefly introduces the Oregon 
 
1 OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.100(1)(c) (2011) (“Except as otherwise provided in 
subsection (6) of this section and ORS 107.726, the juvenile court has exclusive original 
jurisdiction in any case involving a person who is under 18 years of age and . . . [w]hose 
condition or circumstances are such as to endanger the welfare of the person or of 
others.”). For ease of reading, this Comment refers to this statute as the “juvenile 
dependency statute.” 
2 State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Multnomah Cnty. v. Gates, 774 P.2d 484, 487 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1989) (“Jurisdiction for a so-called ‘conditions-and-circumstances’ juvenile hearing 
is not just the power of the court to act. It also requires a factual determination that a child 
is dependent, which is the basis on which the court may make the child a ward of the 
court, that is, may place the child in the court’s ‘jurisdiction.’” (citation omitted)). 
3 This Comment focuses solely on dependency decisions, including initial dependency 
decisions and decisions regarding continuing dependency. Cases analyzing termination of 
parental rights are not included. 
I
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Court of Appeals’ subsequent decisions. A survey of recent court of 
appeals decisions that exemplify this trend follows; the cases are 
grouped according to the type of risk of harm, and the discussion 
focuses on the court of appeals’ reasoning. Part II ends with an 
analysis of how the decisions clarify the standard for dependency 
jurisdiction and highlights the types of cases in which this trend is 
most evident. Part III revisits the constitutional issues and discusses 
how the court of appeals’ decisions protect parents’ fundamental 
constitutional rights. Finally, this Comment concludes with a 
determination that the Oregon Court of Appeals is taking an active 
role in clarifying the standard that juvenile courts should apply when 
considering a dependency petition, effectively limiting juvenile court 
jurisdiction in many cases where the risk to a child is inferred. 
I 
THE COMPETING INTERESTS OF PARENTS, CHILDREN, AND THE STATE 
IN JUVENILE COURT DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS 
In order to help the reader understand the impact of juvenile court 
dependency jurisdiction decisions on parental rights, this Part 
provides a brief overview of constitutional rights in this context, 
along with a discussion of the juvenile court’s role. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized the fundamental right 
of parents to make decisions regarding the upbringing of their 
children,4 stating that “[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care 
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents.”5 Oregon’s Juvenile 
Code recognizes “the rights of parents to direct the upbringing of their 
children, including, but not limited to, the right to: (a) [g]uide the 
secular and religious education of their children; (b) [m]ake health 
 
4 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (“In light of . . . extensive precedent, it 
cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects 
the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 
control of their children.”); Mueller v. Auker, 700 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2012). 
5 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). Some of the earliest cases 
enunciating parents’ rights dealt with parents’ preference in the manner of their children’s 
education. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that Amish parents 
had the right to remove their children from school after eighth grade); Pierce v. Soc’y of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (explaining that a state law requiring parents to send children 
to public school interfered with parents’ liberty). Later cases echoed parental rights in the 
context of medical treatment. See, e.g., In re Green, 292 A.2d 387, 392 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1972) (holding that “as between a parent and the state, the state does not have an interest 
of sufficient magnitude outweighing a parent’s religious beliefs when the child’s life is not 
immediately imperiled by his physical condition” (emphasis omitted)). 
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care decisions for their children; and (c) [d]iscipline their children.”6 
Courts assume that, until proven otherwise, parents look out for and 
act in the best interest of their children.7 While the Supreme Court has 
not discussed parental rights in the context of dependency 
jurisdiction, its reasoning in other types of cases is informative.8 In 
analyzing a visitation statute, the Court stated that 
so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children . . . there 
will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the 
private realm of the family to further question the ability of that 
parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that 
parent’s children.9 
Parents’ rights, however, are not absolute; sometimes they must 
yield to children’s rights or state interests.10 Because children are 
unable to protect themselves, states, in their role as parens patriae,11 
have a duty to protect children. In Prince v. Massachusetts, the 
Supreme Court held that a state could constitutionally intervene to 
protect children from being harmed by their parents.12 “State officials 
may interfere in family matters to safeguard the child’s health, 
educational development and emotional well-being.”13 In other 
words, the state has a legitimate interest in protecting children when 
their well-being is at risk.14  
 
6 § 419B.090(4). 
7 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68. 
8 See State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shugars (In re K. Shugars, T. Shugars, and 
J. Shugars), 121 P.3d 702, 713 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (considering the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in Troxel when interpreting the Oregon juvenile dependency statute). 
9 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69. 
10 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) 
(clarifying that parental rights do not extend to an absolute veto power over girls who seek 
abortion); Prince, 321 U.S. at 167 (stating that “the state has a wide range of power for 
limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare”). For a 
discussion of the balance of parents’ and children’s rights, see Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214 
(recognizing that a state’s interest in promoting education must be balanced with parents’ 
interests); Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 102–03 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that although 
parents have due process rights, their rights do not extend so far as to control their 
children’s school curriculum); Mary Patricia Byrn & Jenni Vainik Ives, Which Came First 
the Parent or the Child?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 305 (2010). 
11 Parens patriae refers to the “power of the state to act in loco parentis for the purpose 
of protecting the property interests and the person of the child.” In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 
(1967); see also Byrn & Ives, supra note 10. 
12 Prince, 321 U.S. at 167. 
13 In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). 
14 In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114, 1118 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (“[T]he right of the parent 
to control every aspect of a child’s life is not absolute. When actions concerning a child 
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An introductory section of the Oregon Juvenile Code recognizes 
that children have a liberty interest in being free from abuse and 
maltreatment. It states that “children are individuals who have legal 
rights. Among those rights are the right to: (A) [p]ermanency with a 
safe family; (B) [f]reedom from physical, sexual or emotional abuse 
or exploitation; and (C) [f]reedom from substantial neglect of basic 
needs.”15 
Juvenile jurisdiction law in dependency cases lies at the interface 
of the state’s interest in protecting children and the rights of parents to 
raise their children in the manner they choose. The Juvenile Code 
acknowledges this tension in a preliminary section outlining the 
policy behind the dependency provisions. It states: 
 It is the policy of the State of Oregon to safeguard and promote 
each child’s right to safety, stability and well-being. The State of 
Oregon recognizes the importance of a child’s relationships with 
parents, siblings, grandparents and other relatives. 
 It is the policy of the State of Oregon to guard the liberty interest 
of parents protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and to protect the rights and interests of children 
. . . . The provisions of this chapter shall be construed and applied in 
compliance with federal constitutional limitations on state action . . 
. with respect to interference with the rights of parents to direct the 
upbringing of their children . . . .16 
Juvenile jurisdiction laws aim to protect children by ensuring their 
safety, even if that means intruding into the home.17 A frequently 
used jurisdictional provision provides that a “juvenile court has 
exclusive original jurisdiction in any case involving a [child] . . . 
whose condition or circumstances are such as to endanger the welfare 
of the [child].”18 Statutes like Oregon’s are broad and flexible to 
 
have a relation to that child’s well-being, the state may act to promote these legitimate 
interests.”). 
15 OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.090(2)(a) (2011). 
16 § 419B.090(3)–(4). 
17 In making a jurisdictional decision, the court determines only whether the child’s 
condition or circumstances are such that he “needs the court’s protection, not the nature or 
extent of the necessary protection.” State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Deschutes Cnty. v. 
Vanbuskirk (In re Emily Wieskamp), 122 P.3d 116, 118 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). Decisions 
about whether a child remains in the home and decisions regarding termination of parental 
rights are made at later proceedings. See State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Lane Cnty. v. 
Brammer (In re F.), 892 P.2d 720, 722 n.5 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (“Our decision merely 
places the children under the protection of the juvenile court. Whether or not they remain 
in the home will be determined in a subsequent proceeding.”). 
18 § 419B.100(1)(c). This is just one of many potential bases for the court to take 
jurisdiction over a child. See § 419B.100(1). 
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provide maximum child protection. Oregon courts, in the exercise of 
interpreting this broad statute, define limits on state authority.19 
Because the juvenile courts’ decisions regarding dependency 
jurisdiction have an immediate and often dramatic impact on families’ 
rights, it is important to track the trends related to dependency 
jurisdiction and to analyze the impact that court decisions have on 
parental and family rights. 
II 
OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF RECENT OREGON COURT OF APPEALS 
CASES 
Oregon Court of Appeals decisions in recent years reflect a marked 
change in the interpretation of the scope of state authority conveyed 
by the Juvenile Code. Circumstances that historically might have 
justified juvenile court jurisdiction over a child despite only minimal 
evidence of risk to the child have been held insufficient. This Part 
begins with an analysis of the only Oregon Supreme Court case 
interpreting “conditions and circumstances” as used in the Oregon 
juvenile dependency statute.20 It then analyzes a sampling of the 
recent court of appeals decisions applying that statute.21 In these 
cases, the court has significantly tightened the requirements for 
juvenile court assertion of dependency jurisdiction. These cases 
exemplify the ongoing trend. 
A. The Oregon Supreme Court’s Decision in Smith 
In 1993, the Oregon Supreme Court issued its sole decision 
interpreting the juvenile dependency statute, State ex rel. Juvenile 
Department of Lane County v. Smith.22 The case involved a six-year-
old boy whose father, on one occasion, had inappropriate sexual 
contact with the boy’s twelve-year-old aunt in the family home.23 The 
 
19 See State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Lane Cnty. v. Smith (In re Jonathan G. Smith), 
853 P.2d 282, 285 (Or. 1993) (stating that the legislative history of the juvenile 
dependency statute “suggests that a general standard, involving the exercise of discretion 
by the juvenile court, would replace a legislative list of conditions or circumstances, the 
existence of which automatically would confer jurisdiction on a juvenile court”). 
20 § 419B.100(1)(c). 
21 It should be noted that other cases involving juvenile dependency jurisdiction were 
also heard during the time period discussed in this Comment, a few of which are 
referenced in footnotes. This Comment focuses on the cases that demonstrate the court of 
appeals tightening the standard for dependency jurisdiction. 
22 Smith, 853 P.2d at 285. 
23 Id. at 283. 
MURRAY (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2014 11:11 AM 
2013] An Analysis of Recent Oregon Court of Appeals Decisions Regarding 729 
Juvenile Dependency & Their Impact on Parental Constitutional Rights 
juvenile court took jurisdiction over the boy based on the risk of harm 
posed by his father.24 The court of appeals reversed, concluding that 
the father’s single incident of sexual conduct toward his son’s aunt 
did not provide enough evidence to draw a valid inference that the 
boy was endangered.25 The Oregon Supreme Court disagreed, 
however, and determined that the father’s act of abusing another child 
in the family’s home, plus additional evidence that the father used 
marijuana in his son’s presence and had a history of mentally and 
verbally abusing his son, supported jurisdiction.26 The court held that 
the father’s conduct created a harmful environment for his son and 
thereby a risk of harm toward his son.27 
The Smith court interpreted the juvenile dependency statute to 
mean that “[i]f, after considering all the facts, the juvenile court finds 
that there is a reasonable likelihood of harm to the welfare of the 
child, the court may take jurisdiction.”28 The court explained that in 
making this determination, a juvenile court must “consider the totality 
of the circumstances.”29 Further, it stated that “[a] condition or 
circumstance need not involve the child directly, but may be found 
harmful by reason of creating a harmful environment for the child.”30 
The court based this holding on a review of legislative history, which 
demonstrated that the legislators intended to craft a flexible and broad 
provision that would protect children from a wide variety of harms.31 
The Oregon Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals’ 
interpretation of the statute—that “the propriety of state intervention 
depends on whether it is more likely than not that harm will come to a 
specific child.”32 The court concurred, however, with the court of 
appeals’ position that no per se rules govern dependency jurisdiction, 
that harm does not have to actually befall a child in order to justify 
 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 286. 
27 Id. at 285. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 284–85. 
32 State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Lane Cnty. v. Smith, 836 P.2d 173, 174 (Or. Ct. App. 
1992) (en banc), rev’d, 853 P.2d 282 (Or. 1993). 
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jurisdiction, and that risk of harm can be sufficient to justify 
jurisdiction.33 
Subsequent to Smith, the court of appeals clarified and reiterated 
this rule in opinions reviewing assertions of juvenile dependency 
jurisdiction. The court of appeals case most commonly cited for the 
overarching rule is State ex rel. Juvenile Department of Deschutes 
County v. Vanbuskirk.34 In Vanbuskirk, the court of appeals wrote: 
“The key inquiry in determining whether ‘conditions or 
circumstances’ warrant jurisdiction is whether, under the totality of 
the circumstances, there is a reasonable likelihood of harm to the 
welfare of the child. It is the child’s condition or circumstances that 
are the focus of the jurisdictional inquiry.” 35 
In another key case, State ex rel. Department of Human Services v. 
Shugars, the court of appeals applied this fact-dependent standard.36 
The court explained that jurisdiction as to each child in a home must 
be a separate inquiry, and in that case the court found that the specific 
factual circumstances supported jurisdiction over only one of the 
children in the household.37 
Over the next five years, the court of appeals continued to refine 
and clarify the rule. In 2011, it crystalized the evolving standard in the 
case of Department of Human Services v. A.F.38 Pulling from Shugars 
and another case, the court held that to support jurisdiction over a 
child, the child’s condition or circumstances must create a threat of 
serious loss or injury to the child, because to endanger means to 
threaten with serious loss or injury.39 Further, the court said that the 
 
33 Compare Smith, 853 P.2d at 285 (rejecting “the proposition that any specific 
condition or circumstance per se does, or does not, establish the juvenile court’s 
jurisdiction,” and holding that a “condition or circumstance need not involve the child 
directly, but may be found harmful by reason of creating a harmful environment for the 
child”), with Smith, 836 P.2d at 175 (rejecting the state’s proposed per se rule and stating 
that harm to one child can provide a basis for jurisdiction over another child because the 
parent has created a harmful environment). 
34 State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Deschutes Cnty. v. Vanbuskirk (In re Emily 
Wieskamp), 122 P.3d 116, 118 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). 
35 Id. (citations omitted) (citing Smith, 853 P.2d at 282, and State ex rel. Dep’t of 
Human Servs. v. Kamps (In re C.K.), 74 P.3d 1123, 1126 (Or. Ct. App. 2003)). For clarity, 
this Comment refers to the rule as stated in Smith and Vanbuskirk as “the Smith rule.” 
36 State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shugars (In re K. Shugars, T. Shugars, and J. 
Shugars), 121 P.3d 702, 710 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). 
37 Id. 
38 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. A.F. (In re T.F., K.F., and R.F.), 259 P.3d 957, 961 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2011). 
39 Id.; see also Shugars, 121 P.3d at 713 (“Endanger connotes exposure to ‘danger,’ 
which generally involves ‘the state of being threatened with serious loss or injury[.]’” 
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evidence must show that the threat exists at the time of the 
jurisdictional hearing and not merely that it had existed at some point 
in the past.40 The A.F. standard clarified the broad Smith standard, 
limiting the court’s jurisdictional reach to cases with evidence of a 
current risk of serious loss or injury.41 
B. Oregon Court of Appeals Decisions 
The Oregon Court of Appeals refined the Smith rule into the A.F. 
rule through a series of decisions beginning in 2005, and more recent 
decisions demonstrate a continuing clarification effort. This section 
surveys exemplary recent decisions by topic, emphasizing points of 
change in the court’s reasoning or in how the standard is applied. The 
sections cover cases concerning: (1) harm to one child as a basis for 
jurisdiction over another child; (2) a parent’s history of sex abuse, 
failure to complete sex offender treatment, or possession of 
pornography; (3) a child’s exposure to domestic violence; (4) a 
parent’s substance abuse; (5) poor parenting decisions; and (6) the 
inability to parent independently. 
When a parent has already harmed a child, courts consistently take 
jurisdiction over the child if he or she continues to be in danger. The 
court of appeals has stated that it is “axiomatic that the physical abuse 
of a child endangers the child’s welfare and, thus, furnishes a basis for 
the exercise of dependency jurisdiction.”42 Therefore, a history of 
physical abuse against the child in question is almost always a basis 
for dependency jurisdiction because the risk of continuing physical 
abuse endangers the child’s welfare.43 For example, the court of 
appeals held that jurisdiction over a seventeen-month-old child was 
appropriate because the State presented evidence of severe bruising 
 
(alteration in original)); State v. S.T.S. (In re R.T.S.), 238 P.3d 53 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) 
(“The state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is a current risk of 
harm and not simply that the child’s welfare was endangered at some point in the past.” 
(citing State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Jackson Cnty. v. S.A. (In re I.R.A.), 214 P.3d 851, 
851 (Or. Ct. App. 2009))). 
40 A.F., 259 P.3d at 961. 
41 Id. In one 2012 case, the court of appeals briefly discussed the characterizations of 
the rule in Smith and A.F., saying that “[t]he two formulations complement each other and 
correctly state the standard.” Dep’t of Human Servs. v. D.M. (In re I.T. and A.C.), 275 
P.3d 971, 973 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). 
42 G.A.C. v. State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Polk Cnty. (In re G.A.C.), 182 P.3d 223, 
228 (Or. Ct. App. 2008). 
43 Id. 
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on his face and head, which an expert witness stated resulted from 
non-accidental physical blows to the child’s head and face by an adult 
hand.44 Like evidence that a child has been physically injured, proof 
of ongoing sexual abuse of a child typically justifies jurisdiction over 
that child.45 For example, the court of appeals held that jurisdiction 
was proper over a fourteen-year-old girl who alleged that her father, 
who had previously been investigated for sexual abuse and had 
authored a graphic novel about child rape, had sexually abused her 
over the course of three years.46 
In addition to recognizing the obvious risk presented by a history 
of abuse of the child in question, the court of appeals has likewise 
found sufficient grounds for jurisdiction in less clear circumstances. 
The following section discusses cases where the evidence shows that 
a parent has harmed another child, but not the child before the court. 
1. Harm to One Child as a Basis for Jurisdiction over Another Child 
Whether a parent’s history of physically or sexually abusing 
another child, even if not his or her own child, is sufficient to 
establish a current threat of harm to his or her child depends on the 
facts and circumstances involved.47 Cases based on this kind of fact 
pattern demonstrate the evolution of the law from the Oregon 
Supreme Court decision in Smith to current applications of the law. 
Under current case law, factors in this determination include the type 
of harm or abuse and the similarity of circumstances between the 
child who was abused and the child in question.48 In addition, 
although risk to one child in a home may indicate risk to other 
children or siblings in the home, it does not always do so, particularly 
when the abused or at-risk child has special needs.49 
 
44 State ex rel. State Office for Servs. to Children and Families v. Imus (In re James 
Imus and Jared Imus), 39 P.3d 213, 219 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). 
45 State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Klamath Cnty. v. T.S. (In re K.S., A.S., B.S., and 
N.S.), 164 P.3d 308, 313–14 (Or. Ct. App. 2007). Note, however, that a single incident of 
sexual abuse may not be sufficient evidence of a risk of harm, absent other evidence. See 
Dep’t of Human Servs. v. M.E. (In re M.S. and M.S.), 297 P.3d 17, 25–26 (Or. Ct. App. 
2013). 
46 T.S., 164 P.3d at 313–14. 
47 State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Kamps (In re C.K.), 74 P.3d 1123, 1127 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2003); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Lane Cnty. v. Brammer (In re F.), 892 P.2d 
720 (Or. Ct. App. 1995). 
48 T.S., 164 P.3d at 314. 
49 State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shugars (In re K. Shugars, T. Shugars, and J. 
Shugars), 121 P.3d 702, 710 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). 
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In three cases decided after Smith but prior to 2005, the court of 
appeals did not focus on proof of current risk to a child as recent case 
law makes clear is necessary.50 In 1995, the court of appeals reversed 
a juvenile court determination that a mother’s conviction for sexually 
abusing her young son’s friend in their family home did not constitute 
proof of a condition or circumstance dangerous to her own children.51 
The court of appeals held that the mother’s past exploitation of the 
boy in her home was sufficient to show “a reasonable likelihood of 
harm” to her children.52 The court emphasized that the law does not 
require a child himself to actually be injured as a prerequisite to 
jurisdiction.53 However, while there was no doubt that the mother 
posed a danger to her son’s friend, there was no evidence that the 
mother or father posed a current threat of harm to their own 
children.54 Therefore, if a case with similar facts came before the 
court today, the court would likely find insufficient evidence of a 
current threat of harm to her children and would deny jurisdiction. 
In a 2002 case, State ex rel. Juvenile Department of Lane County v. 
Parshall, the court of appeals held that the Smith standard supported 
jurisdiction over a baby whose father had previously abused another 
infant child.55 The father served prison time for seriously physically 
abusing his infant, but when he later fathered another child, the 
juvenile court held that there was no evidence of current danger to the 
newborn.56 However, the court of appeals determined that the father’s 
history, even though he had participated in some rehabilitation 
programs, was a sufficient basis to establish jurisdiction over the new 
baby.57 The court was unconvinced that participation in rehabilitation 
programs “mitigated the potential risk” to the baby’s welfare.58 The 
court did not discuss any evidence that demonstrated a current threat 
of serious harm, which the current standard would require.59 
 
50 See Brammer, 892 P.2d 720; State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Lane Cnty. v. Parshall (In 
re Uriah Ni’em Carter), 34 P.3d 713, 713–14 (Or. Ct. App. 2001); Kamps, 74 P.3d 1123. 
51 Brammer, 892 P.2d at 721. 
52 Id. at 722. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55
Parshall, 34 P.3d at 713–14. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 715. 
58 Id. (emphasis added). 
59 Id. at 714 (discussing father’s compliance with all post-prison supervision 
requirements). 
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Therefore, if an analogous case came before the court of appeals 
today, the court would likely hold that without independent evidence 
of a current threat of harm, the absence of rehabilitation evidence 
does not justify jurisdiction.60 
Similarly, in 2003, the court of appeals held that evidence of 
serious physical abuse to a fifteen-month-old child was sufficient to 
support jurisdiction over a younger sibling.61 Although the State was 
unable to prove which adult abused the child, the court did determine 
that the abuse occurred while the child was in the care of the father 
and his girlfriend.62 The court determined that the physical abuse 
suffered by the child justified jurisdiction over the father’s other 
child, the six-month-old baby of the father and his girlfriend, even 
though there was no evidence that the baby had been abused.63 The 
court echoed Smith, holding that there was “a reasonable likelihood 
that [the baby] could suffer harm in the future as well” and that the 
absence of abuse to date was not dispositive.64 
However, in 2005, the court of appeals limited the reasoning that 
harm to one child justifies jurisdiction over all children in a 
household, and emphasized the need for an individualized analysis for 
each child.65 In Shugars, evidence that the parents had neglected a 
child with special needs did not warrant jurisdiction over the child’s 
siblings who were not similarly disabled.66 The neglected child had 
special needs stemming from behavioral and emotional disorders, and 
her parents neglected to follow crucial medical advice about her 
mental health needs.67 While this neglect formed a basis for 
jurisdiction as to that particular child, the court of appeals said that 
the evidence did not show that the child’s siblings, who did not have 
special needs, were endangered—there was no evidence that the 
parents failed to follow through on medical advice regarding the other 
 
60 Cf. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. B.B. (In re K.B.), 274 P.3d 242, 244–45 (Or. Ct. App. 
2012) (holding that father’s failure to complete sex offender treatment did not form a basis 
for jurisdiction over his children). 
61 State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Kamps (In re C.K.), 74 P.3d 1123, 1127 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2003). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shugars (In re K. Shugars, T. Shugars, and J. 
Shugars), 121 P.3d 702, 707–08 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). 
66 Id. at 709. 
67 Id. at 706, 709. 
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children.68 The court contrasted this reasoning with that employed by 
the court in Smith, noting that it makes sense to “postulate that ‘harm 
to one child presents a risk of similar or related harm to other children 
in the same household’ . . . in cases involving sexual or physical 
abuse,” but that cases involving neglect of a special needs child must 
be approached differently.69 
Shortly after the court of appeals decided Shugars, it decided a 
case concerning the impact of a parent’s sexual abuse of one child on 
other children in the household. The court upheld a juvenile court 
order asserting jurisdiction over three brothers based in part on an 
assumption that they were at risk from their father, who had sexually 
abused their sister over a period of years.70 In addition, it concluded 
that the mother’s failure to protect her daughter from the father also 
endangered the boys.71 In so holding, the court of appeals reiterated 
the comment from Shugars that “it is easy to infer the likelihood of 
harm to a child by past physical or sexual abuse of other children in 
the home.”72 Whereas neglect of the special needs child in Shugars 
did not amount to sufficient risk of harm to other children in the 
home, sexual abuse of one child can endanger other children in the 
home. 
As demonstrated by these decisions, whether jurisdiction over a 
child based on risk of harm inferred from harm to another child is 
justified depends upon the facts and circumstances. An independent 
inquiry for each child in the household is required. 
2. A Parent’s History of Sex Abuse, Failure to Complete Treatment, 
or Possession of Pornography 
As previously discussed, cases involving a recent history of sex 
abuse of the child at issue or a similarly situated child in the home are 
typically straight forward. However, when a risk of sexual abuse is 
inferred solely from scant supporting evidence, the court conducts an 
assessment of the evidence provided to determine if such an inference 
 
68 Id. at 709. 
69 Id. at 710. 
70 State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Klamath Cnty. v. T.S. (In re K.S., A.S., B.S., and 
N.S.), 164 P.3d 308, 315 (Or. Ct. App. 2007). The juvenile court also found that the 
mother put the boys at risk of emotional harm by talking about the sexual abuse charges 
and the ongoing case in front of them. Id. at 312. 
71 Id. at 315. 
72 Id. 
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is reasonable. This is exemplified by cases in which the State argues 
that risk to a child should be inferred from a parent’s history of sex 
abuse, failure to complete sex offender treatment, or possession of 
pornography. 
In a notable 2013 case, the court of appeals relied on expert 
testimony to find that a stepfather did not pose a risk of harm to his 
stepchildren or his biological children even though he had allegedly 
sexually assaulted one of his stepdaughters four years prior.73 The 
court focused on the length of time since the incident, the fact that it 
was an isolated incident, and the testimony of a psychologist and sex 
therapist, who determined that the father presented no risk to any 
children in the home.74 The court referenced a prior case in which it 
stated that “[j]urisdiction cannot be based on speculation that a 
parent’s past problems persist at the time of the jurisdictional hearing 
in the absence of any evidence that the risk, in fact, remains.”75 
Similarly, in a 2012 case, the court of appeals held that a father’s 
failure to complete voluntary sex abuse treatment did not constitute 
sufficient evidence of risk to justify jurisdiction over a child.76 The 
father had sexually abused two children when he was a child himself 
and had physically and sexually abused his girlfriend’s children when 
he was about twenty years old.77 He was sentenced to prison in 1996 
and, upon his release, participated in—but did not complete—
voluntary sex offender treatment programs.78 In 1998, he viewed 
child pornography.79 Thereafter, he had four children.80 The State 
failed to present evidence that the father had abused any child in the 
sixteen years prior to the 2011 dependency hearing or that his sex 
offender condition was not in remission.81 Nevertheless, the juvenile 
 
73 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. M.E. (In re M.S. and M.S.), 297 P.3d 17, 26 (Or. Ct. App. 
2013). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. (quoting Dep’t of Human Servs. v. M.Q. (In re G.Q.), 292 P.3d 616, 622 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2012)). 
76 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. B.B. (In re K.B.), 274 P.3d 242, 249 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). 
But see Dep’t of Human Servs. v. M.H. (In re V.H.), 300 P.3d 1262, 1263–64, 1273–74 
(Or. Ct. App.) (finding that a child was at risk of serious loss or injury when the child’s 
father had juvenile and criminal convictions for sex abuse, failed to complete treatment, 
and after experts testified that he had a significant probability of reoffending—even 
potentially against his own biological child), review denied, 308 P.3d 205 (Or. 2013). 
77 B.B., 274 P.3d at 244–45. 
78 Id. at 245. 
79 Id. at 246. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 247. 
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court held that the father’s history of sexual abuse presented a current 
risk of danger to his children because he had not completed voluntary 
treatment and had viewed child pornography thirteen years prior.82 
The juvenile court relied in part on observations made by various 
professionals in the late 1990s regarding their opinions of the father’s 
potential future behavior.83 
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the court could not 
properly draw this inference because neither the father’s distant 
personal history of abusive behavior and pornography viewing nor his 
failure to complete voluntary treatment established a current risk to 
his children, absent other supporting evidence.84 The court stated that 
“there is no presumption that father’s failure to complete treatment 
some 11 years before the jurisdictional hearing, by itself, makes father 
an ‘unremediated sex offender,’ who in turn would be presumed 
dangerous to his children.”85 Further, the juvenile court’s reliance on 
old evaluations was misplaced; the evaluations did not demonstrate 
that the father posed a current risk of harm to his children.86 
In 2013, the court of appeals further clarified how evidence of prior 
sex offenses impacts the jurisdictional analysis. The court held that a 
father’s prior criminal record and his failure to complete sex offender 
treatment did not constitute a current risk of harm to a child.87 In so 
holding, the court relied on two basic principles: that “a person’s 
status as a sex offender does not per se create a risk of harm to a 
child” and “there is no presumption that a party’s status as an 
‘untreated’ sex offender presents a safety risk to a child.”88 Without 
evidence demonstrating how one’s sex offender status or failure to 
complete treatment endangers a child, jurisdiction on this basis is not 
proper.89 
Just as failure to complete sex abuse or offender treatment does not 
in itself justify jurisdiction, neither does possession of pornography. 
 
82 Id. at 246. 
83 Id. at 248–49. 
84 Id. at 246. 
85 Id. at 249. 
86 Id. at 248–49 (“[T]he 14-year gap between [a licensed clinical social worker’s] 
evaluation and the jurisdictional hearing is a temporal canyon, and the 1996 evaluation 
does not establish that father currently poses a risk of harm to the children.”). 
87 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. G.J.R. (In re Z.M.R.), 295 P.3d 672, 676–77 (Or. Ct. App. 
2013). 
88 Id. at 676. 
89 Id. 
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In two recent cases, the court of appeals considered whether 
possession of pornography alone is sufficient to prove that children 
are at risk of sex abuse, rejecting the claim in both.90 In A.F., the 
juvenile court determined that a father’s possession of adult 
pornography and a few partially downloaded files of child 
pornography endangered his children, finding a risk that they could be 
exposed to the pornography and a risk that the father could become 
sexually abusive.91 The court of appeals reversed, citing expert 
testimony in the case to the effect that while possession of 
pornography may be a red flag about a person’s potential to become 
an abuser, possession itself is not determinative.92 Further, the court 
pointed out that there was no evidence that the father had possessed 
pornography since the initial allegation, thus the risk that the children 
would be exposed to pornography no longer existed.93 
The court applied the Smith standard, holding that in order to have 
jurisdiction over a child, “the child’s condition or circumstances must 
give rise to a threat of serious loss or injury to the child.”94 Further, 
the court specified that the threat must be current.95 Therefore, even if 
possession of pornography could possibly be a basis for jurisdiction, 
the lack of evidence in this case that there was “a current risk of such 
exposure for the children at the time of the hearing” prohibited 
jurisdiction on that basis.96 Likewise, the State failed to present 
sufficient evidence that the father’s history of possessing pornography 
created a risk that he would abuse his children.97 In formulating its 
reasoning and holding, the court of appeals drew from previous 
decisions that emphasized the need for a current risk, and for an 
adequately serious risk, effectively creating a limit on the reach of 
juvenile court jurisdiction based on an inference of harm.98 
 
90 See Dep’t of Human Servs. v. R.V. (In re C.P.), 287 P.3d 1281, 1281 (Or. Ct. App. 
2012); Dep’t of Human Servs. v. A.F. (In re T.F., K.F., and R.F.), 259 P.3d 957, 962 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2011). 
91 A.F., 259 P.3d at 961. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id.; see also Dep’t of Human Servs. v. R.V. (In re C.P.), 287 P.3d 1281, 1281 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2012) (holding that possession of pornography within reach of the child was not a 
basis for jurisdiction when the risk of exposure did not exist at the time of the hearing; on 
appeal, the state conceded this error). 
97 A.F., 259 P.3d at 961. 
98 Id.; see State v. S.T.S. (In re R.T.S.), 238 P.3d 53 (Or. Ct. App. 2010); State ex rel. 
Juvenile Dep’t of Jackson Cnty. v. S.A. (In re I.R.A.), 214 P.3d 851, 851 (Or. Ct. App. 
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These decisions show that in cases involving a risk of sex abuse, 
the court cannot infer current risk from acts of sex abuse many years 
prior, from a parent’s failure to complete sex offender treatment, or 
from possession of pornography because these factors are insufficient 
on their own to create a risk of harm. 
3. A Child’s Exposure to Domestic Violence 
The court of appeals has also considered other situations in which a 
child may be at risk because of a parent’s conduct. Exposure to 
domestic violence is such a situation because a custodial parent who 
has been in a violent relationship may continue to be involved in 
violent relationships. The court of appeals addressed this issue in 
three recent cases, concluding that exposure to domestic violence can 
form the basis for jurisdiction over a child if the domestic violence is 
continuing or is very likely to continue in the future.99 
In a 2010 case, the juvenile court found that witnessing physical 
violence between parents can cause harm to children.100 The court of 
appeals held that jurisdiction was justified over both a four-year-old 
child, who hid and was frightened during his parents’ fights, and his 
infant brother, who was born after the parents separated.101 Although 
the parents were not living together at the time of the hearing, the on-
again, off-again nature of the parents’ relationship supported the 
juvenile court’s decision to take jurisdiction because the court 
expected the couple to reunite, and there was a “reasonable likelihood 
that [the father’s physical and verbal abuse] would continue were the 
couple to again reunite.”102 
Similarly, in 2013, the court of appeals found sufficient evidence 
of a current threat of harm to two young children who were exposed 
to domestic violence even though the most recent incident had 
occurred eighteen months prior to the hearing.103 The mother feared 
the father, had previously obtained a protective order against him, and 
 
2009); State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shugars (In re K. Shugars, T. Shugars, and J. 
Shugars), 121 P.3d 702, 713 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). 
99 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. L.G. (In re L.H.), 281 P.3d 681, 684 (Or. Ct. App.), aff’d 
as modified, 290 P.3d 19 (Or. Ct. App. 2012); S.T.S., 238 P.3d at 57. 
100 S.T.S., 238 P.3d at 57. 
101 Id. at 57–58. 
102 Id. at 57. 
103 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. C.F. (In re E.F.), 308 P.3d 344, 346–47 (Or. Ct. App.), 
review denied, 314 P.3d 964 (Or. 2013). 
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allegedly could not leave the house at her will.104 The court concluded 
that the mother’s “behavior demonstrated a pattern that is common in 
domestic violence, which presents a risk to the children.”105 
Therefore, the court upheld the juvenile court’s order taking 
jurisdiction over the children.106 
In contrast, in a 2012 case, the court of appeals held that 
jurisdiction based on exposure to domestic violence is not proper 
when “there is no evidence . . . that mother is currently in a 
relationship with an individual who might pose a risk to [the 
child].”107 In light of domestic violence between the mother and 
father, the juvenile court took jurisdiction of the couple’s infant 
son.108 In a later review hearing when the court considered whether 
the evidence supported contested jurisdiction over the child, the 
juvenile court continued jurisdiction even though the mother testified 
that the circumstances that originally justified jurisdiction no longer 
existed.109 On appeal, the court found that the mother and child no 
longer had contact with the father and that the evidence suggested that 
the mother was unlikely to reconcile with him.110 Therefore, the court 
said, the evidence did not support the juvenile court’s conclusion that 
the child was still at risk of harm from exposure to domestic 
violence.111 Whereas the juvenile court determined that the mother’s 
failure to recognize the potential harm to the child if the couple 
reconciled constituted a risk of harm, the court of appeals held that 
this potential risk did not satisfy the requirement for a current risk of 
harm.112 
As demonstrated by these cases involving domestic violence, 
parental behavior can, but does not always, create an environment in 
which harm to a child is likely to occur. Similarly, a parent’s 
substance abuse can potentially create a harmful environment. 
 
104  Id. at 347. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. L.G. (In re L.H.), 281 P.3d 681, 684 (Or. Ct. App.) 
(emphasis omitted), aff’d as modified, 290 P.3d 19 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). 
108 Id. at 682. 
109 Id. at 683. 
110 Id. at 684. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
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4. A Parent’s Substance Abuse 
A parent’s abuse of drugs or alcohol may endanger a child because 
the parent may actively harm the child or fail to provide adequate care 
to the child. A series of cases dating at least to 1989 addresses 
whether a parent’s history of substance abuse or current abuse 
constitutes per se evidence that a child is at risk. In 1989, the court of 
appeals stated that while a parent’s drug use is a proper consideration 
when determining jurisdiction, without specific allegations of how the 
drug use endangers the child, it is insufficient to establish 
jurisdiction.113 More recent cases have developed the principle that a 
parent’s history of alcohol abuse is not a sufficient basis for juvenile 
dependency jurisdiction when there is no current danger to the 
child.114 The court explained, “[e]vidence of, inter alia, how recently 
and frequently the parent uses alcohol and the effects of that use on 
the parent’s conduct would be necessary to determine whether the 
parent’s alcohol use creates a ‘reasonable likelihood of harm to the 
welfare’ of his or her child.”115 Similarly, evidence that a child has 
been exposed to an intoxicated parent is not alone sufficient for 
jurisdiction; the evidence must show how that exposure endangers the 
child.116 
In two 2009 cases, the court of appeals reversed juvenile court 
orders taking jurisdiction based on a parent’s history of alcohol abuse. 
In State ex rel. Department of Human Services v. D.T.C., the father 
had a history of alcohol abuse and acting out when drinking, and he 
had not successfully completed treatment programs.117 Based on this 
evidence, the juvenile court found that alcohol abuse interfered with 
his ability to parent and that he was unable to provide a safe home for 
his children.118 The court of appeals disagreed.119 It said that a 
 
113 State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Marion Cnty. v. Randall (In re Rebecca and Michelle 
Randall), 773 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (“Although we agree with the state that 
a parent’s use of controlled substances is a proper consideration in determining whether a 
child should be made a ward of the state, that allegation is insufficient by itself to establish 
that the child’s welfare is endangered.”). 
114 State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. D.T.C. (In re D.A.C.), 219 P.3d 610, 615 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2009). 
115 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. A.F. (In re T.F., K.F., and R.F.), 259 P.3d 957, 962 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2011) (citing State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Deschutes Cnty. v. Vanbuskirk (In re 
Emily Wieskamp), 122 P.3d 116, 118 (Or. Ct. App. 2005)). 
116 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. D.S.F. (In re M.R.F.), 266 P.3d 116, 122 (Or. Ct. App. 
2011). 
117 D.T.C., 219 P.3d at 612–13. 
118 Id. 
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parent’s abuse of alcohol, “without more . . . is not inherently or 
necessarily more harmful or dangerous than other varieties of 
parenting that would, by no stretch of the imagination, justify state 
intervention into the parent-child relationship.”120 The court of 
appeals also held that the father’s failure to complete recommended 
treatment programs did not justify jurisdiction because the State did 
not prove that the father was currently abusing alcohol, was currently 
at risk of relapsing, or even that relapse would endanger the 
children.121 
In the second case, State v. A.L.M., the father’s history of 
alcoholism had been resolved by the time of a dependency review 
hearing.122 The juvenile court had originally ordered jurisdiction over 
the child because the mother, who had legal custody, left the child 
with unfit caregivers and because the father’s alcoholism prevented 
him from protecting the child from their mother.123 At the 
dependency review hearing, the juvenile court determined that 
continued jurisdiction was appropriate.124 The court of appeals 
reversed, holding that the child was not within the courts’ jurisdiction 
because the father was willing and able to care for the child.125 It 
found no evidence in the record that the child’s welfare was 
endangered at the time of the hearing because the father was not 
currently abusing alcohol, and the mother presented no current danger 
because she was no longer involved with the child.126 
The court of appeals has similarly and repeatedly held that a 
parent’s history of drug abuse alone does not justify jurisdiction.127 
Most recently, the court of appeals held that a mother’s history of 
marijuana use did not justify jurisdiction over her three children 
because there was no evidence of drug use in the three months leading 
up to the dependency review hearing.128 The juvenile court erred in 
relying solely on the mother’s past drug use: without evidence of 
 
119 Id. at 615. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 615–16. 
122 State v. A.L.M. (In re N.E.C.), 220 P.3d 449, 451 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 450. 
125 Id. at 451. 
126 Id. at 451–52. 
127 See, e.g., Dep’t of Human Servs. v. G.E. (In re N.E.), 265 P.3d 53, 54 (Or. Ct. App. 
2011). 
128 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. C.J.T. (In re C.E.W.), 308 P.3d 307, 310–11 (Or. Ct. App. 
2013). 
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current drug use, there was “no evidence in the record establishing a 
nexus between mother’s marijuana use and any current threat of harm 
to the children.”129 
Similarly, in Department of Human Services v. G.E., the court of 
appeals reversed jurisdiction over a child whose mother, according to 
the juvenile court, had unresolved substance abuse problems.130 The 
mother had a substance abuse problem in the past and, although she 
participated in treatment, she did not complete the program.131 The 
court of appeals reversed, finding that the evidence did not show that 
the mother currently suffered from substance abuse and that there was 
no evidence that a parent’s substance abuse alone endangers a 
child.132 
Likewise, in 2012, the court of appeals held that jurisdiction over a 
child was not properly supported when the juvenile court speculated 
that the father used drugs without actual evidence of such use.133 The 
father had a history of drug abuse, but no evidence suggested that his 
drug use was ongoing at the time of the hearing.134 Further, no 
evidence supported an inference that the father might relapse and use 
drugs in the future in such a way that would endanger the child.135 
The court of appeals held that “the juvenile court erred in asserting 
jurisdiction on the basis of any concern about [the father’s] potential 
for relapse.”136 
Similarly focusing on the need for evidence of a current risk of 
harm, the court of appeals reversed a juvenile court dependency order 
over children whose father allowed them to have contact with their 
mother, who had a substance abuse problem.137 The juvenile court 
opined that as the children aged they would become more aware of 
their mother’s problems, and this knowledge could harm them 
 
129 Id. at 310. 
130 G.E., 265 P.3d at 54. 
131 Id. 
132 Id.; see also Dep’t of Human Servs. v. N.P. (In re T.P.), 296 P.3d 606, 609 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2013) (explaining that the evidence did not support jurisdiction over a child whose 
father had a history of drug and alcohol abuse but was clean at the time of the dependency 
hearing), aff’d on reh’g, 307 P.3d 444 (Or. Ct. App. 2013). 
133 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. M.Q. (In re G.Q.), 292 P.3d 616, 623 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). 
134 Id. at 622. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 623. 
137 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. D.S.F. (In re M.R.F.), 266 P.3d 116, 122–23 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2011). 
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psychologically.138 The court of appeals, however, focused on the 
absence of evidence of any current danger to the children from their 
father’s actions or from contact with their mother.139 The father acted 
protective of the children, allowing the mother to stay with him and 
the children only when she was sober.140 While acknowledging that 
the mother’s substance abuse had an effect on the family, the court 
stated that “[m]any children face the reality of a parent’s illness or 
death, and limited exposure to that reality—as the children here have 
had and will likely continue to have—does not constitute 
endangerment.”141 The court also observed that, although the mother 
had a history of repeated substance abuse and treatments, there was 
no evidence that she had ever abused the children.142 Because there 
was no evidence that exposure to the mother put the children at risk of 
a serious loss or injury, the court of appeals determined that 
jurisdiction was not proper.143 
Finally, in a 2010 case, the court of appeals held that even proof of 
a parent’s current use of marijuana did not support jurisdiction, 
standing alone.144 The juvenile court had ordered jurisdiction because 
the mother’s drug dependency made her unable to care for the 
children.145 However, the court of appeals reversed because there was 
no evidence that the mother used marijuana around the children or 
otherwise made the home unsafe for them.146 Because there was “no 
evidence that the mother’s substance abuse was a ‘condition or 
circumstance’ that ‘endanger[ed] the welfare’ of her children,” 
jurisdiction was not proper.147 The court distinguished the mother’s 
drug use in this case from the father’s drug use in Smith, stating that 
“the juvenile court did not find that mother had used drugs in the 
presence of children, or in the home, or that her drug use created a 
harmful environment for the children.”148 
 
138 Id. at 123 (“Awareness of a parent’s substance abuse problems does not, in and of 
itself, give rise to a risk of serious loss or injury.”). 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id.  
143 Id. at 124. 
144 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. C.Z. (In re K.A.M.), 236 P.3d 791, 794–95 (Or. Ct. App. 
2010). 
145 Id. at 793. 
146 Id. at 794–95 (alteration in original). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 794. 
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While exposure to a parent’s drug use alone is typically insufficient 
to warrant jurisdiction, it can form a basis for jurisdiction in 
combination with other risk factors. In the 2009 case of State ex rel. 
Juvenile Department of Yamhill County v. N.W., the court of appeals 
affirmed a juvenile court decision ordering jurisdiction over a one-
year-old child whose mother, who had a history of drug abuse, 
knowingly took him to a house where drug use was common and 
allowed him to have contact with a known registered sex offender.149 
The State presented evidence that the mother knew that drugs were 
actively being used in the house while they were there, and that she 
made no attempt to keep the child from having contact with the 
known sex offender.150 The court of appeals held that although each 
of the mother’s actions might not independently justify jurisdiction, 
taken in combination they did.151 The court stated that “the danger 
that is inherent in contact with untreated sex offenders is heightened 
by the use of controlled substances,”152 and the mother’s 
complacency and willingness to put the child in this situation 
endangered the child.153 
These court of appeals decisions demonstrate that a parent’s use of 
alcohol or drugs does not typically justify jurisdiction, although it can 
when combined with other risk factors. 
5. Poor Parenting Decisions 
The holding in N.W. does not mean, however, that parents who 
allow their children to be exposed to unsavory situations or who make 
other bad parenting decisions are necessarily putting their children at 
sufficient risk of harm to support juvenile court jurisdiction. The 
Oregon Court of Appeals has stated that a court cannot base 
jurisdiction simply on a theory that a child’s parents have not been 
model parents, as being a model parent is not the standard.154 
 
149 State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Yamhill Cnty. v. N.W. (In re L.W. and T.J.P.), 221 
P.3d 174, 179–80 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). 
150 Id. at 179. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 178. 
153 Id. at 180. 
154 State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shugars (In re K. Shugars, T. Shugars, and J. 
Shugars), 121 P.3d 702, 710 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). 
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This point is illustrated by the 2012 case of Department of Human 
Services v. D.M.155 The case concerned a child whose mother had a 
history of substance abuse, discussed being an escort and a dancer in 
front of the child, allowed the child to receive gifts from an adult 
man, and did not supervise the child’s access to the Internet.156 The 
mother did not contest the court’s initial assertion of jurisdiction, but 
at a later review hearing she argued that the evidence did not support 
continuing jurisdiction because her substance abuse issues were 
resolved.157 The juvenile court disagreed, holding that the mother’s 
conduct and poor judgment regarding boundaries with men showed 
that she was not adequately supervising the child.158 The court of 
appeals reversed, stating that “[e]xposure to a parent’s unconventional 
but not unlawful lifestyle, receipt of lavish gifts from a parent’s 
friends or relatives, and an unspecified amount of unsupervised access 
to the Internet do not justify state intervention into a parent’s 
fundamental right to the care, control, and custody of her children.”159 
The court discussed the failure of the State to provide sufficient 
evidence that the mother’s supervision “exposed the girl to ‘a 
reasonable likelihood of harm,’ much less a current threat of serious 
loss or injury.”160 
In other cases involving poor parenting decisions, the court of 
appeals has similarly found no basis for juvenile court jurisdiction. In 
two of the most interesting cases, juvenile courts based jurisdiction on 
a parent’s failure to complete drug treatment programs, and in both 
the court of appeals reversed.161 The court concluded that although it 
may be beneficial for the parent to complete such programs, taking 
 
155 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. D.M. (In re I.T. and A.C.), 275 P.3d 971, 973–74 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2012). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 972. 
158 Id. at 974. 
159 Id. 
160 Id.; cf. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. T.A.H. (In re D.H.), 306 P.3d 790, 791 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2013) (holding that jurisdiction was proper over children when a mother left an 
infant with unfit caregivers, resulting in fractures and serious injuries; failed to protect her 
children from domestic violence of the father; failed to supervise the children; and did not 
understand their basic needs). 
161 See Dep’t of Human Servs. v. B.B. (In re K.B.), 274 P.3d 242, 244–45 (Or. Ct. App. 
2012) (explaining how a father’s failure to complete sex offender treatment did not form a 
basis for jurisdiction over his children); State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. D.T.C. (In 
re D.A.C.), 219 P.3d 610, 615 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (explaining how a father’s failure to 
complete alcohol treatment program did not constitute evidence of current risk of harm to 
children). 
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jurisdiction because of a parent’s failure to do so is not necessarily in 
line with the statutory requirement of basing jurisdiction on the 
child’s condition or circumstance.162 
Another example in the context of continuing jurisdiction is seen in 
Department of Human Services v. A.R.S.163 The juvenile court had 
originally taken jurisdiction of a child at birth because the mother 
displayed residential instability and had chosen unsafe partners, 
among other factors.164 Five years and multiple appeals later, these 
two factors were the only remaining bases for jurisdiction.165 The 
evidence showed that the mother had recently moved multiple times, 
but that her current residence was approved for visitation.166 
Additionally, the mother had recently lived with a partner who 
threatened violence against himself, but she moved out and ended the 
relationship immediately thereafter.167 The court of appeals 
determined that although the evidence showed that the mother moved 
multiple times, “residential instability is not a sufficient basis for 
jurisdiction without a showing that it creates a risk of harm to the 
child,” and the State failed to show such evidence.168 Further, 
although the mother had lived with a partner who may have been 
unsafe, she reacted appropriately by immediately leaving that person, 
and “any conclusion that [the] child was at risk because of mother’s 
choice of [boyfriend] is speculative.”169 Because there was 
insufficient evidence of a risk of harm from the mother’s living 
situation, and because risk from her prior boyfriend was speculative at 
best, the court determined that jurisdiction was no longer warranted 
by law.170 
Also in 2013, the court of appeals determined that a mother’s 
negative comments toward one child, which made the child feel less 
liked than her sibling, did not demonstrate a risk of serious injury or 
loss.171 While occasionally calling the child “stupid” or “brat” may 
 
162 See D.T.C., 219 P.3d at 614–15. 
163 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. A.R.S. (In re N.S.), 310 P.3d 1186 (Or. Ct. App. 2013). 
164 Id. at 1189. 
165 Id. at 1187–88, 1190. 
166 Id. at 1190–91. 
167 Id. at 1191. 
168 Id. at 1194. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. M.E. (In re M.S. and M.S.), 297 P.3d 17, 26–27 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2013). 
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indicate that the mother was not an ideal parent, it did not alone 
support jurisdiction over the child.172 This principle is also seen in the 
court’s decision in A.F.,173 where a father’s possession of 
pornography did not justify jurisdiction, and in the many cases in 
which the court has held that a parent’s alcohol or drug use is not 
sufficient to justify jurisdiction.174 
6. Inability to Parent Independently 
In another group of cases, juvenile courts have asserted jurisdiction 
over children whose parents were mentally disabled, based on 
findings that the parents, acting alone, could not adequately care for 
their children.175 Because the evidence in these cases showed that the 
parents were not raising children alone, but instead had the support of 
other adults, the court of appeals reversed. 
In the 2011 case of Department of Human Services v. B.L.J., the 
mother had mild mental retardation and was not able to care for her 
young children alone.176 The mother, however, lived with an adult 
couple who were willing and able to help raise the children.177 The 
juvenile court held that the mother’s cognitive problems impaired her 
ability to parent, and that her reliance on other adults did not alleviate 
this concern because her living arrangement with them could 
change.178 The court of appeals reversed that decision because the 
law does not require that a parent be able to raise her children 
independently.179 The court of appeals focused on the children’s 
 
172 Id. 
173 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. A.F. (In re T.F., K.F., and R.F.), 259 P.3d 957, 961 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2011). 
174 See, e.g., Dep’t of Human Servs. v. C.Z. (In re K.A.M.), 236 P.3d 791, 794–95 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2010). 
175 For more in-depth information on the implications of mental illness for mothers in 
dependency and custody proceedings, see Jennifer E. Spreng, The Private World of 
Juvenile Court: Mothers, Mental Illness and the Relentless Machinery of the State, 17 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 189 (2010). 
176 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. B.L.J. (In re N.E.F.-J.), 268 P.3d 696, 699 (Or. Ct. App. 
2011). 
177 Id. at 698. 
178 Id. at 699. 
179 Id. The Court of Appeals has applied the same logic to permanency hearings. See 
Dep’t of Human Servs. v. A.R.S. (In re N.S.), 278 P.3d 91, 92–93 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (“In 
[B.L.J.], we held, relying on Smith, that the mother's inability to parent her children 
without the assistance of a couple with whom the mother was living and who were willing 
to support the mother in her parenting did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of harm 
to the welfare of the children sufficient to warrant juvenile court jurisdiction. It necessarily 
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condition and determined that the evidence did not show a current 
risk of harm to the children.180 Not only were there other capable 
adults present and assisting with the children’s care, there was no 
evidence that the mother would be on her own with the children.181 
Further, the State failed to present sufficient evidence that the mother 
would harm the children even if she did live independently.182 
The court applied this reasoning again in 2012, in a case involving 
a mother who was mentally delayed and a father who was uneducated 
and had some mental health problems.183 The mother received in-
home assistance with daily living skills.184 The mother and father 
initially did not know how to care for their newborn, but they 
received instruction from Healthy Start and from nurses at the 
hospital, and they had family members who were willing and able to 
assist them.185 Despite the parents’ access to assistance, the juvenile 
court ordered jurisdiction over the baby based on the mother’s 
developmental delay, the father’s mental health concerns and anger 
issues, and the father’s failure to “present[] himself as a parenting 
resource” or “demonstrate that he is able to provide the infant with the 
necessary care.”186 The court of appeals, however, held that the 
evidence did not show that the father was unable to function as a 
parent or that he currently had mental health or anger issues.187 
Further, even though the mother was developmentally delayed, the 
court of appeals found that “the evidence [was] legally insufficient to 
support the trial court’s finding that mother [was] ‘not able to meet 
the basic needs of the child, due [to] her delays and medications.’”188 
Because the State did not show a risk of harm to the child as required 
by Smith, jurisdiction based on inadequate parenting experience and 
mental disabilities was not justified.189 
 
follows that the determination of a parent's progress toward reunification following the 
establishment of jurisdiction also may not be based on that requirement.”). 
180 B.L.J., 268 P.3d at 700 (“DHS must prove that there is a current risk of harm.”). 
181 Id. at 699–700. 
182 Id. 
183 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. S.P. (In re K.P.), 275 P.3d 979, 982 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 983–84. 
186 Id. at 983. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 989 (first two alterations added). 
189 Id. (“As we have recently emphasized, the burden is on the state to show that harm 
is, in fact, present, and the state failed to meet that burden here.” (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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The court previously used this reasoning in a 2009 case, in which 
the State alleged that an alcoholic father was unable to care for his 
children adequately.190 The evidence showed that the father was 
attempting to quit drinking, and more importantly, even if he did 
drink, his sober girlfriend was always present to ensure that the 
children were properly cared for.191 While the allegation that the 
father had, on occasion, passed out from drinking concerned the court 
of appeals, the father’s sober girlfriend’s consistent presence and 
assistance with caring for the children alleviated the concern that the 
father could not adequately care for the children alone.192 
These opinions demonstrate that the court of appeals is not willing 
to infer a risk of harm to a child simply because a parent has mental 
delays, particularly when others are available to help with the child 
rearing. The further application of this reasoning to an alcoholic 
parent shows that the court’s focus is properly on the child’s 
condition or circumstance, not the characteristics of the parent. 
C. Analysis of Fact Patterns and Court Decisions 
This review of cases demonstrates that the Oregon Court of 
Appeals has clarified the standard for determining jurisdiction, from 
the broad standard originally enunciated by Smith, to the more clear 
standard enunciated in A.F. The court’s decisions since 2005 have 
further clarified the application of the governing statute in many 
different contexts. The court now analyzes whether there is a current 
risk of serious injury or loss in looking to see if there is a reasonable 
likelihood of harm to a child. 
The court of appeals’ decisions clarify when jurisdiction over one 
child is warranted based on jurisdiction over another child in the 
household and differentiate between cases in which there is a direct 
risk of serious harm and cases in which harm is inferred.193 
Focusing on the current risk of harm, the court of appeals properly 
questions the appropriateness of juvenile court jurisdiction based on 
past parental behavior.194 Even when the type of behavior could 
 
190 State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. D.T.C. (In re D.A.C.), 219 P.3d 610, 615 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2009). 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 Compare State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Shugars (In re K. Shugars, T. 
Shugars, and J. Shugars), 121 P.3d 702, 709 (Or. Ct. App. 2005), with State ex rel. Dep’t 
of Human Servs. v. Kamps (In re C.K.), 74 P.3d 1123, 1127 (Or. Ct. App. 2003). 
194 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. B.B. (In re K.B.), 274 P.3d 242, 246 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). 
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provide a valid basis for jurisdiction if it were ongoing, behavior that 
occurred years earlier does not justify jurisdiction absent indications 
of current risk.195 
The court of appeals also focuses its analyses on the conditions and 
circumstances affecting the children rather than the conditions or 
attributes of the parents. A parent’s history of sexual abuse or 
possession of pornography does not in and of itself justify 
jurisdiction; there must be evidence of how the parent’s conduct 
endangers the child.196 Further, the mere potential for harm in the 
future is often not a valid basis for jurisdiction because the risk of 
harm is not current, as demonstrated by the recent decisions involving 
exposure to domestic violence.197 
As with other parental behavior, a history of drug or alcohol abuse, 
absent other factors, does not justify jurisdiction.198 “The fact that a 
parent engages in behavior that could negatively affect his or her 
parenting does not necessarily mean that the behavior can serve as a 
basis for juvenile court jurisdiction over a child.”199 As long as a 
parent is caring for his child adequately, state intervention is not 
necessary and should not occur.200 
Additionally, a parent’s inability to parent independently is not a 
proper basis for jurisdiction when there is no evidence of a reasonable 
likelihood of harm to the child.201 Rather than focusing on the 
personal challenges faced by a mentally deficient parent, the proper 
analysis is whether, “under the totality of the circumstances, there [is] 
a reasonable likelihood of harm to the welfare of the children.”202 
Taken together, the cases surveyed in Part II demonstrate how the 
Oregon Court of Appeals is working to clarify the standard for 
 
195 Id. 
196 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. A.F. (In re T.F., K.F., and R.F.), 259 P.3d 957, 961 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2011). 
197 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. L.G. (In re L.H.), 281 P.3d 681, 684 (Or. Ct. App.), aff’d 
as modified, 290 P.3d 19 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). 
198 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. D.T.C. (In re D.A.C.), 219 P.3d 610, 614 (Or. Ct. App. 
2009). 
199 Id.; see also Dep’t of Human Servs. v. C.Z. (In re K.A.M.), 236 P.3d 791, 794–95 
(Or. Ct. App. 2010). 
200 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.090 (2011). 
201 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. B.L.J. (In re N.E.F.-J.), 268 P.3d 696, 699–700 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2011). 
202 Id. at 700 (alteration omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t v. Vanbuskirk (In 
re Emily Wieskamp), 122 P.3d 116, 118 (Or. Ct. App. 2005)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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juvenile dependency jurisdiction. While it is proper to infer risk of 
harm when there is a current danger of physical or sexual abuse to a 
child, the court clarified that it is often not proper to infer risk based 
on parental behavior or indirect harm. The cases surveyed in this 
Comment are exemplary of an ongoing trend in juvenile dependency 
law. 
Although the court has not often enunciated this goal, by limiting 
dependency jurisdiction in cases such as those involving parents who 
have a history of substance abuse, parents who rely on other adults for 
parenting assistance, parents who possess pornography, and parents 
whose conduct may make their parenting less than ideal, the court of 
appeals is protecting parents’ constitutional rights. 
III 
THE IMPACT OF RECENT COURT DECISIONS ON PARENTAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
The recent Oregon Court of Appeals decisions have defined a 
delicate balance, protecting children while also protecting parents’ 
constitutional rights. Although the court does not typically speak to 
constitutional rights in its opinions, the court undoubtedly weighs its 
decisions’ impact on parental constitutional rights. 
As discussed previously, parents have a fundamental right to make 
decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their children, as 
well as to the companionship of their children.203 The “right to family 
integrity includes the most essential and basic aspect of familial 
privacy—the right of the family to remain together without the 
coercive interference of the awesome power of the state.”204 So long 
as a parent adequately cares for his or her children, the state should 
not get involved in private family matters.205 This fundamental 
interest does not evaporate simply because a parent is not a model 
parent.206 
Because parents’ interests in child rearing and relationships are 
fundamental, family rights are always implicated in dependency 
cases.207 Over half of the cases that the Oregon Court of Appeals has 
 
203 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66. 
204 In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 455 A.2d 1313, 1318 (Conn. 1983) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
205 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68. 
206 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). 
207 Dep’t of Human Servs. v. J.R.F. (In re D.S.), 273 P.3d 87, 91 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) 
(“[D]ue process rights of parents are always implicated in the construction and application 
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reviewed in the last twenty years resulted in reversal based on 
insufficient evidence. Even though an order of jurisdiction does not 
always result in removal of the child, a determination against 
jurisdiction prevents removal of the child. Taking jurisdiction over a 
child based on insufficient evidence unfairly intrudes into family 
privacy, and the appeals process is onerous and further intrusive. 
Moreover, unwarranted state interference with family integrity 
violates substantive due process.208 Even if due process is satisfied 
and there is no constitutional violation, the state’s imposition still 
affects the family. Further, even if a dependency decision is reversed, 
parents can suffer consequences from the proceeding, such as 
employment restrictions, limitations on involvement with children’s 
activities, and a negative bias in future interactions with the state.209 
However, although the intrusion on parents’ rights may end up 
being unwarranted, the state must look out for children’s right to be 
free from abuse.210 Children, like their parents, have the right to 
family integrity.211 When the juvenile court orders jurisdiction over a 
child based on insufficient evidence, the child’s right to family 
integrity is violated. The dependency process can be damaging to a 
child, damage that should be avoided in the absence of sufficient 
cause to proceed.212 With such vital rights on the line, the state’s 
 
of the provisions of ORS chapter 419B.”). See also State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Lane 
Cnty. v. Brammer (In re F.), 892 P.2d 720, 722 n.5 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing how 
decisions regarding juvenile jurisdiction are just that—regarding jurisdiction; the decision 
whether to remove a child from the home is completely independent). 
208 Crowe v. Cnty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 441 (9th Cir. 2010). 
209 See State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t of Washington Cnty. v. L.B. (In re A.B.), 226 P.3d 
66, 68–69 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (“[The parents] argued, among other things, that father has 
suffered and will continue to suffer adverse employment consequences as a result of the 
finding of jurisdiction; that mother and father would be restricted in their involvement in 
child’s life as far as activities at school, such as accompanying child on field trips; and that 
the jurisdictional finding and underlying DHS administrative findings would be used 
against them if there were any need in the future for DHS to intervene.”). 
210 OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.090(a) (2011). 
211 Id. 
212 See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the Children: The 
Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 413, 417 (2005) (discussing that through investigations of child abuse, “in the name 
of saving children from the harm that their parents and guardians are thought to pose, 
states ultimately cause more harm to many more children than they ever help”). 
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decision regarding dependency jurisdiction has a potentially 
tremendous impact on both the parents and the child.213 
One can certainly understand the juvenile court’s tendency to err 
on the side of caution for the benefit of protecting children, but the 
impact on children and their parents from erroneous decisions cannot 
be ignored. To protect the rights of families, the focus of the 
jurisdiction analysis must remain on the conditions or circumstances 
of the child. Poor parental choices or less than ideal parental behavior 
do not equate to endangering a child’s welfare without sufficient 
evidence, and only current risks of harm should be considered in 
determining jurisdiction. The court of appeals’ recent trend to limit 
the cases in which jurisdiction can be based on an inferred risk of 
harm protects families’ constitutional rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The Oregon Court of Appeals has actively worked to clarify the 
proper standard for taking jurisdiction over a child on the basis of risk 
of abuse or neglect, as exemplified in the preceding sample of cases. 
The standard evolved case-by-case from the broad “reasonable 
likelihood of harm” rule in Smith, to the “current risk of serious loss 
or injury” rule crystalized in A.F. In further clarifying this standard, 
the court has limited the juvenile courts’ reach when jurisdiction is 
based on an inferred risk. By doing so, the court of appeals is 
protecting parental rights while ensuring that the state can continue to 
effectively protect children.  
As more juvenile court dependency orders are successfully 
appealed, parents will have even greater incentive to appeal 
aggressively, particularly in cases without evidence of past or current 
physical or sexual abuse and where the court is relying on an 
inference of risk or is basing jurisdiction on a parent’s conduct. The 
juvenile courts must be cognizant of this and should evaluate each 
case very closely to determine whether there truly is sufficient 
evidence to warrant jurisdiction over a child before intruding into a 
family. The court of appeals’ recent clarification of the law should 
provide the juvenile courts with helpful instruction regarding the 
amount and type of evidence required in various circumstances. 
 
 
213 See Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Nicole 
Stednitz, Ending Family Trauma Without Compensation: Drafting § 1983 Complaints for 
Victims of Wrongful Child Abuse Investigations, 90 OR. L. REV. 1423, 1432–33 (2012). 
